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Reading the Product: Warnings, 
Disclaimers, and Literary Theory 
Laura A. Heymann* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few television commercials for alcohol end with the protagonist 
slumped unconscious on the couch, falling off a bar stool, or driving a car 
into a telephone pole. To the contrary, as many of us have experienced, 
advertising writes a very different narrative: that purchase and 
consumption of the advertised beverage will make one more attractive, 
expand one's social circle, and yield unbridled happiness. It is a story 
that, the advertiser hopes, will inspire consumers to choose its beverage 
during the next trip to the store; in this vein, the true protagonist of the 
commercial is the brand. 
Marketing scholars and, to a lesser extent, trademark scholars have 
increasingly viewed advertising and branding through the lens of literary 
theory, recognizing that consumers interpret communications about a 
product using many of the same tools that they use to interpret other kinds 
of texts. 1 But this lens has not been similarly focused on an important 
counternarrative: the warning or disclaimer (such as "Caution: This 
product may contain nuts" on a candy bar or "Not authorized by 
• Associate Professor of Law, College of William & Mary- Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Many 
thanks to Jessica Silbey and the participants in the "Reasoning from Literature" panel at the 2010 
AALS Annual Meeting, where this work was first presented. Many thanks also to Peter Alces, Mark 
Badger, Barton Beebe, Deborah Gerhardt, and Lisa Ramsey for helpful comments; to the staff of the 
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities for their very thoughtful and perceptive edits; and to Brad 
Bartels and Katharine Kruk Spindler for research assistance. 
I. That is not to say that trademark scholarship has ignored literary theory; Barton Beebe's work 
is an exemplar. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. 
REv. 2020 (2005). Representative examples from the marketing literature include Elizabeth C. 
Hirschman, Linda Scott & William B. Wells, A Model of Product Discourse: Linking Consumer 
Practice to Cultural Texts , 27 J. ADVERTISING 33 (1998); Linda M. Scott, The Bridge from Text to 
Mind: Adapting Reader-Response Theory to Consumer Research, 21 J. CONSUMER REs. 461 , 461~2 
(1994) (hereinafter Scott, The Bridge); Barbara B. Stern, Textual Analysis in Advertising Research: 
Construction and Deconstruction of Meanings, 25 J. ADVERTISING 61, 62~ (1996) (giving an 
overview of the field). 
393 
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Starbucks" on a poster that uses the chain's logo to humorous effectV 
While all forms of branding, advertising, and marketing are ways of 
communicating information about a product to consumers, warnings and 
disclaimers are a special kind of communication: unadorned, declarative 
statements purportedly meant to cause a consumer to act in a particular 
way or reach a specific cognitive result. 3 They are counternarratives both 
in the voice they adopt-less emotional, more stentorian-and in the 
message they communicate. 4 But narratives they remain. 
The fact that warnings and disclaimers are counternarratives does not, 
however, mean that consumers are powerless to interpret them in the face 
of the emotional appeal of the primary narrative of the brand. For 
example, as one court noted, "a beer manufacturer's commercial images, 
although enticing, are not enough to neutralize or nullify the immense 
body of knowledge a reasonable consumer possesses about the dangers of 
alcohol."5 In other words, the average consumer can receive, and even be 
2. The closest appears to be Victor E. Schwartz and Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the 
Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38 
(1993); a related effort from the linguistics scholarship is Roger W. Shuy, Warning Labels: Language, 
Law, and Comprehensibility, 65 AM. SPEECH 291 (1990). More recent attempts to address the 
interplay between advertising and product warnings have relied on behavioral economics and 
cognitive science. See, e.g., MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUYOLOGY: TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE 
BUY 15 (2008) (reporting on fMRI study that showed that cigarette warning labels "not only failed to 
deter smoking, but by activating the nucleus accumbens ... actually encouraged smokers to light 
up"); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 
696-721 (1999) (reviewing literature); id. at 637 (noting that "advertising, promotion, and price setting 
all become means of altering consumer risk perceptions, regardless of mandated hazard warnings"). 
3. Cf JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 67 (1969) (suggesting that a warning "is like advising, rather 
than requesting. It is not, I think, necessarily an attempt to get you to take evasive action."). Of 
course, some producers may include warnings and disclaimers simply in an attempt to avoid liability; 
courts or regulators that reward this activity are presumably doing so based on a belief that such 
communications have some effect on consumers. 
4. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Your Mileage May Vary: A General Theory of Legal Disclaimers, 
7 PIERCE L. REv. 85, 88 (2008) ("Generally, a disclaimer tells some audience that some other text or 
circumstance does not mean or imply what one might otherwise think."). One might say that the 
authoritative voice of a warning or disclaimer renders these messages the primary narrative, with the 
more emotional appeal of the branding effort then becoming the countemarrative. (Thanks to Barton 
Beebe for this point.) Indeed, recent regulation of cigarette branding proposed by the Australian 
government achieves this result visually. See Bettina Wassener & Meraiah Foley, Australia Fights 
Tobacco with Taxes and Plain Packs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B9 (describing Australian law 
that will require, as of July I, 2012, tobacco products to be sold in packaging "with few or no logos, 
brand images, or colors" but with "graphic health warnings, including photographs of the effects of 
smoking-related diseases."). My focus here is on the purported tension between the branding message 
and the warning or disclaimer; the precise position each occupies, while very interesting to consider, is 
not critical to the argument. 
5. Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); id. ("[A] 
reasonable consumer could not, as a matter of law, ignore basic common knowledge about the dangers 
of alcohol and justifiably rely upon beer advertisements and their idyllic images to conclude that the 
prolonged and excessive use of alcohol is safe and acceptable."). See also, e.g., Robinson v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 00-D-300-N, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22474, at *7 (M.D. Ala. July 7, 2000) 
("In light of the public's common knowledge, Anheuser-Busch had no duty to add in its advertising[] 
'to the flow of information' about the dangers of drinking. Where the public possesses common 
knowledge about the risk of harm flowing from the use of a product, a manufucturer is not required to 
provide a 'redundant warning."') (citation omitted), ajf'd, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22475 (M.D. Ala. 
Aug. I, 2000); Bertovich v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., No. 5:05CV74, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
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emotionally affected by, the romantic narrative of a television commercial 
and still reconcile a competing narrative, whether that story comes from an 
explicit statement from the advertiser ("Please drink responsibly") or from 
other sources. If this were not the case, regulators would not require 
manufacturers to include warnings on product packaging or in advertising, 
and courts in product liability cases would not fault manufacturers for 
failing to adequately warn consumers of the risks posed by their products. 
This belief is not, however, universal. Indeed, the prevailing view 
among some commentators and courts appears to be that consumers are 
too susceptible to advertising stories to fully understand the information in 
a disclaimer or warning-that their commitment to the brand narrative 
leaves them unable (or unwilling) to make room for dissenting voices. 6 
Consumers, in this worldview, often take little notice of warnings about 
the risks of using a product and remain confused about a product's source 
even after hearing a direct message that no affiliation or endorsement 
exists.7 For example, one court was willing to leave to the jury the 
question of whether a manufacturer was required to provide a warning 
about alcohol's effects, concluding that advertising's depiction of "the 
good life" as including moderate consumption of alcohol might require an 
equally prominent disclosure to make the beer "safe for its intended 
LEXIS 59047, at *44-*46 (N.D. W.Va. Aug. 17, 2006) (citing cases). 
6. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Trnynor, J., concurring) 
("The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a 
product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled 
by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices 
such as trade-marks.") ; Peter Tiersma, The Language and Law of Product Warnings, in LANGUAGE IN 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 54, 58 (Janet Cotterill ed., 2002) ("Faced with an apparent contradiction between 
the name of a product in large print (Sure-Guard) and a warning in much smaller letters that the 
product is not unbreakable, we tend to give more credence to the emphasi[z)ed message."). Cf 
Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers , I 03 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1733-34 (2003) 
("[T]he history of products liability jurisprudence is littered with eloquent paeans to the consumer, 
whose acquisitive habits are seen as representing the driving force behind the success of modern 
capitalism, but whose haplessness and gullibility are seen to require constant safeguarding by the 
courts."); id. at 1753 (describing views by some courts of consumers as so blinded by advertising and 
marketing efforts that they are unable to effectively assess risk). 
7. Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: 
More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 57-58 (1996) (recommending that 
empirical studies as to effectiveness of disclaimers be conducted before disclaimers are mandated); 
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations , 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1195, 
1198 (1994) (noting that "consumer inattention to warnings is very common"); Michael B. Mazis et 
al., An Evaluation of the Alcohol Warning Label: Initial Survey Results, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & 
MARKETING 229, 240 (1991) (reporting some awareness of warning messages but with caveats); Fred 
W. Morgan & Jeffrey J. Stoltman, Television Advertising Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment, 16 J. 
Bus. & PSYCHOL. 515, 532-33 (2002) (concluding that consumers overestimate their ability to 
perceive disclosure information in television advertising); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as 
Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 737, 742-43 (2007) (summarizing academic research 
concluding that disclaimers "rarely affect consumer perceptions in the overall context of advertising or 
packaging"); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication: Warnings and Risk, 
545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 110-111 (1996) (citing studies determining that 
warning information included with prescription drugs goes unread but noting a much higher rate for 
warnings regarding cigarettes). 
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purpose."8 Another court held that the word "UNAUTHORIZED" in 
"relatively small lettering, surrounded by an orange bordering" at the top 
of the front cover of a book about Godzilla was insufficient to alert readers 
that the book was not authorized by the maker of the Godzilla films; 
instead, the court suggested, the front cover should have stated that "the 
publication [had] not been prepared, approved, or licensed by any entity 
that created or produced" the original film, despite the fact that this same 
information was provided on the back cover of the book in capital letters, 
"highlighted by its appearance against a blue background."9 Thus, among 
these courts and commentators, warnings and disclaimers are like 
footnotes: they provide important information that explains, supports, or 
offers caveats to the message in the main part of the text, but we don't 
always expect readers to take notice of them. 10 
Thus, the law sends a mixed message regarding what it expects of 
consumers as readers of products. In some instances, the law encourages 
these types of communications even when consumers are faced with 
highly persuasive advertising. For example, the failure~to-wam doctrine 
in product liability cases is predicated on the claim that the plaintiff's 
injuries would not have occurred if the manufacturer had provided an 
appropriate warning, which assumes that the consumer would have read 
and heeded such a warning had it been available. But at other times, 
courts are more skeptical, crediting the views of commentators that such 
communications are ineffective. For example, in trademark infringement 
cases, courts sometimes send discouraging signals about disclaimers, 
requiring empirical evidence that such statements of source can overcome 
8. Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.3d 510,515-515 (3d Cir. 1987) ("If a jury finds that Stroh's 
marketing of its product has effectively taught the consuming public that consumption of beer on the 
order of eight to twelve cans of beer per week can be a part of the 'good life' and is properly 
associated with healthy, robust activities, this conclusion would be an important consideration for the 
jury in determining whether an express warning was necessary to make Old Milwaukee beer safe for 
its intended purpose."). Similarly contrasting cases occur with respect to injuries suffered from hot 
beverages. Compare Amended Complaint for Damages, at '1) IV.C, Liebeck v. McDonald's 
Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1993 WL 13651163 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 5, 1993); 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant McDonald's Corporation's Motion for Post-trial Relief, Liebeck v. 
McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 16777828 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 
12, 1994) (jury award of$160,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages for 
third-degree bums sustained from coffee spill despite warning on cup reading "Caution. Contents 
hot.") with lmmormino v. J & M Powers, 91 Ohio Misc. 2d 198,202-203 (Ohio C.P. 1998) (granting 
defendant ' s motion for summary judgment on claim alleging injury from hot tea, noting that "the 
population of society is thoroughly aware from childhood of the dangers of a hot liquid spill"). 
9. Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213-14 (C.D. Cal. 1998); id. 
at 1214 (concluding that, due to the ineffectiveness of the disclaimer and the low purchase price of the 
book, "many consumers will simply buy the [b)ook with the most attractive cover"). 
10. J. M. Balkin, The Foomote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 276 (1989) (noting that readers oflegal 
writing "skim over [footnotes], or even disregard them, on the assumption that the 'essence' of the 
article is contained in the body of the text"). Cf Arthur D. Austin, Foomotes as Product 
Differentiation, 40 V AND. L. REv. 1131, 1138 (1987) {characterizing academic footnote writers as 
"[t]aking a cue from the Madison Avenue advertising tactics that exult the irrelevant and divert 
consumers' attention from the values of substance by resorting to mind conditioning techniques"). 
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the harm posed by the consumer's engagement with the product. This 
conflicted approach suggests that, at the very least, courts haven't yet 
abandoned faith in consumers' interpretive skills; accordingly, the goal 
should be to find ways to ensure that warnings and disclaimers are 
effective, rather than assuming ab initio that they simply don't work. 
While behavioral economics has contributed many important insights to 
this debate, literary theory provides an additional consideration. By 
recognizing that warnings and disclaimers are texts, we might well 
discover that the narrative of the text (instead of or in addition to its visual 
presentation) can affect its reception. Literary theory helps us to recognize 
that both disclaimers and warnings are part of a larger category of texts 
that appear, on their face, to be counternarratives: They involve authorial 
voices, reader responses, and meanings different from those of the main 
narrative of the advertisement, telling consumers that the message they 
have previously received requires additional information to form a 
complete communication. But it also helps us to understand that simply 
because a text comprises both a primary narrative and its counternarrative 
doesn't mean that consumers abandon their interpretive skills. To the 
contrary, consumers often encounter and interpret such texts successfully, 
particularly when these writings appeal to context and are cognizant of the 
interpretive communities to which they are presented. 
Literary theory's role in reconciling the law's vacillations in this area is 
particularly crucial today. A focus on "law as narrative" requires us to 
determine who functions as storytellers and who functions as audience. In 
an age and a medium in which we all can be both, consumers have 
become increasingly adept at reading and negotiating communications that 
diverge from the direct producer-consumer, one-way conversation of the 
past century. Incorporating the insights of literary theory into the law of 
marketing closes a conceptual circle that has long been forming: the idea 
that we are created by, and in turn create, the products with which we 
engage, and that we are in a constant process of interpretation with regard 
to the messages that attend this creation. 
II. WARNINGS AND DISCLAIMERS 
Both warnings and disclaimers seem to be a natural outgrowth of 
modern commerce, in which products may pass through several hands 
before reaching the consumer, and in which the use of the product may be 
separated both in time and in distance from the point of sale. Whereas 
consumers could previously communicate directly with the seller in a 
face-to-face conversation, many of consumers' conversations with 
manufacturers about products now take place via text: from the 
manufacturer through advertising, operating manuals, warnings, and 
disclaimers and from the consumer through e-mails, blogs, and other 
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social media technologies (and, if things go wrong, legal filings). 11 
Although the lawfulness of manufacturers' communications to consumers 
turns on how those communications are interpreted, courts and 
commentators have reached differing views on the nature of this 
interpretive activity. 
A. Warnings 
Product warnings, as commentators have noted, have two purposes: to 
"inform[] consumers of the risk level associated with a product or an 
activity,"12 and to encourage users of the product or participants in the 
activity to exercise appropriate care, such as by wearing safety goggles or 
taking other precautionary measures. 13 The presence or absence of a 
product warning has been one criterion for judging whether a 
manufacturer has met its legal requirement to provide a safe product to 
consumers. 14 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for strict 
liability for physical harm for a seller of a product in a "defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property," so long as the seller "is engaged in the business of selling such 
a product," and the product "is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold."15 Comment j to section 402A notes that the absence of a warning 
may make a product unreasonably dangerous if the danger is not one that 
is generally known or that the consumer would reasonably expect. 16 In 
contrast, a seller is not required to warn of dangers that are "generally 
known and recognized," such as the risk of injury from the use of a 
kitchen knife. 17 Indeed, if a consumer already knows of the risk, a warning 
II . As of this writing, Twitter in particular has become a popular way for consumers to broadcast 
unsatisfYing experiences and for corporations to monitor (and respond to) such feedback. See, e.g., 
Jack Neff, Can One Bad Tweet Taint Your Brand Forever?, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 22, 2010, 
http:/ /adage.com/digital/article?article _ id= 142205. 
12. W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 
48 Rl!TGERS L. REv. 625,625 (1996). 
13. /d.; see also, e.g., Scheman-Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg. Co., 816 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002) (noting that an appropriate warning should "cause a reasonable man to exercise for his 
own safety caution commensurate with the potential danger" and "contain some wording directed to 
the significant dangers arising from failure to use the product in the prescribed manner"). 
14. Product liability law is largely a matter of state law and therefore varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. I make no attempt to provide anything approaching a comprehensive review here. For an 
overview, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998). 
15. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1977). 
16. ld. cmt. j; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) 
(noting that a product is defective when, "at the time of sale or distribution," it bears "inadequate 
instructions or warnings"). The "overwhelming majority" of U.S. case law had followed comment j of 
the Second Restatement, Victor E. Schwartz, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: When Clear and Adequate 
Warnings Do Not Prevent the Imposition of Product Liability, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 47, 52 (1999); the 
full effect of the Third Restatement, released in 1998, remains to be seen. 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j {1977); see also RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt.j {1998) (same). 
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imposes additional costs, both on the manufacturer (which must invest 
resources in devising and communicating the warning) and on the 
consumer (who will waste time on already known information and, as a 
result, possibly fail to read important, unknown information). 18 
The activity of warning is not enough, of course; the warning must also 
be read and understood (whether actually or constructively) to constitute a 
complete communication. 19 Many commentators, focusing on consumers' 
cognitive abilities, have concluded that consumers do not always read, 
understand, or respond to product warnings. 20 This can result from a 
number of factors, including suboptimal presentation of the warning, 
information overload or other cognitive biases, deliberate decisions to 
disregard the information, lack of English literacy, or exigent 
circumstances.21 The Restatement also recognizes the myriad factors at 
play, noting that "[i]t is impossible to identify anything approaching a 
perfect level of detail that should be communicated in product 
disclosures."22 Despite these foundational assumptions, the law continues 
to accord product warnings legal significance, presuming that consumers 
will read and follow an appropriate warning. 23 The Second Restatement 
provides that when an appropriate warning is given, "the seller may 
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded"; the product is thereby 
understood not to be defective or unreasonably dangerous. 24 The Third 
Restatement, while retreating from the suggestion that a warning absolves 
a manufacturer from the duty to implement a reasonably safer design, did 
not eliminate the presumption that consumers are able to interpret 
appropriate warnings as to any remaining risk. 25 Indeed, the plaintiff in a 
failure-to-warn case relies on such a presumption in alleging that the 
manufacturer's failure to provide a warning caused her injuries. Had an 
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. j (1998); Henry E. Smith, 
The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. !105, 1168-69 (2003) 
("As in the context of warnings of tort law, the costs of furnishing notice (or a warning) are sometimes 
taken to embrace only the costs of writing down a description of the problem. This ignores the 
problem of the recipient of the message and her costs.") (footnote omitted). 
19. In the area of pharmaceutical warnings, courts have adopted the "learned intermediary" 
doctrine, in which the physician takes on the responsibility of communicating the substance of the 
warning to the end user. Ames v. Apothecon, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 566, 568 (D. Md. 2006) (''The 
doctrine's essence is that if the prescribing doctor (the learned intermediary) has received adequate 
notice of a drug's risks the manufacturer has no duty to warn the consumer."). 
20. Cf Kysar, supra note 6, at 1747 (characterizing the work of scholars who promote disclaimers 
and warnings as reflecting a "robust conception of consumer sovereignty"). 
21. Latin, supra note 7, at 1206-47; Viscusi, supra note 12, at 627, 665. 
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (!998) ("For example, 
educated or experienced product users and consumers may benefit from inclusion of more information 
about the full spectrum of product risks, whereas less-educated or unskilled users may benefit from 
more concise warnings and instructions stressing only the most crucial risks and safe-handling 
practices."). 
23. Latin, supra note 7, at 1196 (calling this view an "unrealistic behavioral presumption"). 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A cmt. j (1977). 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCI'S LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. I (1998). 
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appropriate warning been provided, the argument goes, the injury the 
plaintiff sustained would not have occurred because the plaintiff would 
have read and followed such a warning. 26 Thus, there appears to be no 
motivation to eliminate such communications: consumers desire them and 
the law creates incentives to provide them. 27 
B. Trademark Disclaimers28 
Corporations use trademarks or service marks in order to communicate 
to consumers the source of their goods; by using these marks, a consumer 
can easily locate the products or services she wishes to buy in the 
marketplace.29 Trademark infringement occurs when a defendant uses the 
trademark of another in a way that is likely to create confusion among 
relevant consumers as to the source of its goods or services. 30 But because 
trademark rights are not rights in gross, entities may seek to use a term or 
logo that, on its face, is similar or identical to the mark of another entity. 
For example, a manufacturer engaging in comparative advertising may 
want to mention the trademarked good of its competitor in order to make 
the comparison more directly, while a commentator engaging in parody or 
satire may want to use a trademarked logo in order to communicate 
effectively. 31 In such instances, the second entity may include a 
disclaimer in its advertising or other promotional materials that attempts to 
disassociate such use from the trademark holder by disclaiming any 
relationship, sponsorship, or authorization. 
As with product warnings, scholars often assert that trademark 
disclaimers are ineffective, raising similar questions of information 
overload, graphic presentation, and other cognitive concems.32 More 
26. See, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., No. ED 92770, 2009 WL 4932736, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Dec. 22, 2009), reh'g and transfer denied (Jan. 25, 2010) ("[A] failure to warn claim must be 
supported by evidence that the plaintiff would have pursued an alternative course of action in heeding 
the warning."). 
27. Indeed, because there is no liability attached to overwarning, a risk-averse manufacturer will 
typically err on the side of providing warnings even for obvious dangers. Viscusi, supra note 12, at 
628 (noting diluting effect of overwarning). 
28. Although the term "disclaimer" could refer to any communication from a manufacturer that 
provides additional information to the consumer, including those related to product safety or efficacy, 
I focus here on trademark-related disclaimers as another example of textual communications to 
consumers. 
29. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125. 
31. See Mike Madison, In Your (North) Face, Madisonian, http:/lmadisonian.net/2010/01/15/in-
your-north-facel (characterizing this question as whether "the right to critique and parody includes 
engaging [a trademark owner] on the same turf where [it] makes [its] own case: products and marks"). 
32. Jacob Jacoby & Maureen Morrin, "Not Manufactured or Authorized by ... ": Recent Federal 
Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKT'G 97, 104 (1998) (noting that 
despite empirical evidence showing that trademark disclaimers are typically ineffective, "the federal 
courts often order trademark disclaimers as a remedy in infringement cases"); Mitchell E. Radin, 
Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 
TRADEMARK REP. 59,61 (1986) (asserting that disclaimers of association do not alleviate likelihood 
of confusion and are "difficult to frame and implement"). 
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specifically, some commentators have taken the view that the presence of 
the trademark owner's mark in the disclaimer (as in, for example, "not 
authorized by Brand XYZ") serves to reinforce the connection between 
the defendant and the plaintiff rather than disrupt it, thus constructing the 
consumer as so much under the sway of the brand that she is incapable of 
interpreting the disclaimer's counternarrative as such. 33 In contrast to their 
view on product warnings, however, courts sometimes agree with this 
assessment, rejecting the limited remedy of a disclaimer as ineffective in 
the face of consumer confusion34 or placing the burden on the defendant to 
demonstrate empirically that the disclaimer in question is effective35 rather 
than to assume that a properly presented disclaimer would be in the 
consumer's best interest. 
When courts and commentators do favor the use of trademark 
disclaimers, it is often due to First Amendment-related or competitive 
interests rather than due to any particular view of the consumer as reader. 36 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, while noting that "some studies have 
33. See, e.g. , Radin, supra note 32, at 65. 
34. See, e.g. , August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc ., 59 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
"few consumers will read" a disclaimer); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding use of prefix "UN" before "AliTHORIZED DEALER" insufficient "when used on 
signage designed to attract speeding motorcyclists"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime!Movie 
Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding disclaimer ineffective due to distance 
between disclaimer and infringing material). 
35. See, e.g., Profitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy 
P.C. , 314 F.3d 62, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2002); Charles of Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 
832 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1987). 
36. See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. 
Co., 290 F.3d 578, 599 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[W]e believe that district courts should consider ordering the 
narrowest remedy possible to protect the public from misleading product names or advertising. This 
may include using disclaimers rather than absolute prohibitions on speech."); Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 
488-89 (2005) (suggesting that a "conspicuous disclaimer" could be an appropriate remedy in certain 
cases involving confusion as to sponsorship of merchandising); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, 
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 449-50 (2010) (suggesting that courts could require 
disclaimers "as the cure for certain minor types of trademark harm"); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REv. 381, 446-447 (2008) (suggesting that a 
disclaimer in lieu of an injunction may be required as a First Amendment matter) ; Tushnet, supra note 
7, at 748 (contending that disclaimers would be a preferred remedy in trademark infringement cases if 
courts correctly applied First Amendment doctrine, which requires that "government interventions into 
the commercial speech market be minimal"). Cf Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive 
Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 708 (1985) ("In theory, then, a decision to require a more prominent 
disclaimer [in advertising] should depend on a balance between the benefits of a reduced risk of 
deception and the costs of an increased risk of interference with useful information.") . This is not to 
say, of course, that defendants' interests and consumers' interests cannot be aligned. See, e.g., 
Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 60 (2008) 
(advocating recognition of the interests ofnonconfused consumers in trademark cases). 
Scholars have also endorsed the use of disclaimers by users of copyrighted works as a normative 
matter if not as a legal requirement. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF 
CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 151-55 (2010) (advocating 
disclaimers as part of a proper moral rights regime); Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright 
Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 155 (2007) (suggesting that 
disclaimers in fan fiction have become less prevalent but that fans still value giving credit to original 
authors). 
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suggested that disclaimers have little or no effect in preventing consumer 
confusion," nevertheless concluded that a disclaimer may well be 
appropriate when a case involves "a defendant who had a substantial 
interest in continued use of the mark, either because of past investment 
that had built up goodwill or because of the defendant's interest in using 
its own name. "37 Similarly, courts have encouraged the use of disclaimers 
by resellers of used goods. For example, in Champion Spark Plug 
Company v. Sanders,38 the Supreme Court rejected the trademark owner's 
argument that the defendant's retention of the plaintiffs trademark on 
reconditioned goods constituted trademark infringement, given the 
presence of a disclaimer noting that the goods were used. 39 As long as the 
reconditioned article was "clearly and distinctly sold as repaired or 
reconditioned rather than new," held the Court, there was no harm to the 
trademark owner.40 Additionally, when parody or satire is involved, 
courts are more sanguine about consumers' ability to understand a 
disclaimer. For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci 
Publications,41 the defendant published a parody advertisement on the 
back cover of a humor magazine, using the Michelob trademark to make a 
point about environmental issues. Although the Eighth Circuit reversed 
the district court, holding that the parody was likely to cause confusion as 
to Anheuser-Busch's participation in or approval of the advertisement, the 
appellate court suggested that changes in the parody's presentation, 
including "an obvious disclaimer," could have led to a different result. 42 
Indeed, although the cases did not involve trademarked goods, the 
Supreme Court has on several occasions endorsed the use of disclaimers 
when First Amendment interests were at stake, without expressing concern 
that individuals might be incapable of interpreting such 
37. Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984,990-91 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Greater Anchorage, 
Inc. v. Nowell, No. 91-35232, No. 91-35473, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 22906. at *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 
1992) (holding that the defendant's interest in using the plaintiffs trademarked name on a 
commemorative pin rendered a disclaimer an effective remedy to dispel any lingering consumer 
confusion as to the source of the pin). 
38. 331 U.S. 125 (1947). 
39. !d. at 127-28. 
40. !d. at 130 ("[T]he second-hand dealer gets some advantage from the trade mark. But ... that 
is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the 
products resulting from wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer. Full disclosure gives the 
manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled."). 
41. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
42. !d. at 776. The actual disclaimer, the court noted, was "found in extremely small text running 
vertically along the right side of the page." !d. at 772; see also Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. 
Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (D. Minn. 2005) ("Although the Lanham Act does not require that a parody 
carry a disclaimer, the fact that the parody carries a label stating 'satire' or 'parody' should alert most 
consumers that the item is a parody.") (internal quotation marks omitted). One court has suggested 
that consumers are adept enough to recognize parodies involving trademarks such that no disclaimer 
may be needed. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 496 
(2d Cir. 1989) ("There is no requirement that the cover of a parody carry a disclaimer that it is not 
produced by the subject of the parody, and we ought not to find such a requirement in the Lanham 
Act."). 
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counternarratives. 43 
In one respect, this approach mirrors that taken with respect to product 
warnings, in that a disclaimer does not relieve an entity of the obligation to 
take reasonable steps to avoid consumer confusion but can serve to 
remedy any residual harm (just as a warning does not relieve a 
manufacturer of the duty to provide a reasonably safe product but can 
serve to limit risk remaining thereafter). On the other hand, the view that 
disclaimers are appropriate only when the defendant is engaging in 
speech-related or other valued activity serves to highlight the inconsistent 
approach the law takes to counternarratives in the product space. 
Consumers can either interpret such texts or they can't; the countervailing 
values that are present in the case should not change that result. 
C. Summary 
Both product warnings and trademark disclaimers, then, constitute an 
instance of communication from a manufacturer to a consumer, presenting 
information that may bear on the consumer's decision to purchase the 
product in the first place, use the product, or make additional purchases in 
the future from the same manufacturer. Despite general statements from 
some courts and commentators that these texts are ineffective because 
consumers rarely notice, read, or internalize such communications, courts 
continue to accord legal significance to warnings and disclaimers, 
particularly when the harm to be prevented cannot be reduced in an 
otherwise cost-effective or principled manner. Thus, unless courts are 
intentionally encouraging inefficiency by requiring defendants to engage 
in window dressing, they must be operating under the assumption that 
consumers do in fact understand properly presented disclaimers. If this 
were not the case, courts would presumably have abandoned reliance on 
such communications as an appropriate remedy across the board. 
III. READING THE PRODUCT 
Given that courts are willing to credit consumers with the ability to 
interpret product-related communications, one might question the 
conventional view that consumers lack this ability. The behavioral 
43. See. e.g. , Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 08-205, 2010 WL 183856 (Jan. 21, 
2010), at *39 ("The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and 
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.") (statutory requirement that 
corporate sponsors of electioneering communications provide a disclaimer noting their affiliation with 
the advertisement); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J ., concurring) (noting that a reasonable person "would certainly be able to read and 
understand an adequate disclaimer") (religious displays); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (noting that warnings or disclaimers might be 
"appropriately required" in order to "dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception") 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (lawyer advertising). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Yale J.L. & Human. 404 2010
404 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 22:393 
economics literature has contributed to this belief about consumers, noting 
that consumers operate under a number of cognitive constraints, heuristics, 
and biases that lead them to draw inferences different from that intended 
by the manufacturer.44 But literary theory-and specifically a reader-
response approach to textual interpretation-provides an additional layer 
of explanation, suggesting that narrative voice, reader autonomy, and 
interpretive communities are also part of the equation. 
A. Reader-response theory45 
The development of the concept of the Romantic author at the end of the 
eighteenth century was necessarily in tension with a focus on the reader. 
Describing the author in reverential terms, such as a "genius," led to a 
view of the author as deity and his creative output as a demonstration of 
spiritual inspiration. As Louise Rosenblatt suggests, this rendered the 
reader virtually superfluous, "freeing the poet from even the duty of 
seeking to communicate to a reader."46 Reader-response theorists,47 by 
contrast, locate meaning in the reader, rather than in the author or in the 
text, highlighting the malleability of language and the resulting 
multiplicity of meanings.48 It follows, however, that a text's meaning is 
stable only when an interpretive community of readers coalesces around a 
particular interpretation, informed by its experiences and context; no such 
stability is inherent in the text itself or derives from the author's intentions 
or desires.49 In short, reader-response theory holds that "understanding is 
a product of both the text and the prior knowledge and viewpoint that the 
44. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2; Latin, supra note 7. 
45. As with the earlier background discussion, the overview here ofliterary theory is necessarily 
cursory and incomplete. 
46. LOUISE M. ROSENBLATT, THE READER, THE TEXT, THE POEM: THE TRANSACTIONAL THEORY 
OF THE LITERARY WORK 2 (1978). Rosenblatt cites John Stuart Mill as representative of this view. 
See id. (discussing Mill's characterization of poetry as a "soliloquy ... overheard") (quoting JOHN 
STUART MILL, Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties, in I DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 71 
(London, John W . Parker 1859)). 
47. Commentators have suggested that the term "reader-response theory" does not represent a 
"conceptually unified critical position" but rather comprises a variety of theories that focus on readers' 
interpretation of texts as a source of meaning. See, e.g., Jane P. Tompkins, An Introduction to Reader-
Response Criticism, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM 
ix, ix (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980). 
48. ROSENBLATT, supra note 46, at 15 (noting that literary critics who claim to be objective "do 
not include in their theoretical assumptions recognition of the fact that even the most objective 
analysis of 'the poem' is an analysis of the work as they themselves have called it forth"); Scott, The 
Bridge, supra note I, at 463 ("A reader-response interpretation tries to show how a text works with the 
probable knowledge, expectations, or motives of the reader."). 
49. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES 14-15 (1980) (hereinafter FISH, IS THERE A TEXT); ROSENBLATT, supra note 46, at 58; 
Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 
563 (1982) ("[T]he act of reading itself is at once the asking and answering of the question, 'What is it 
that is meant by these words?,' a question asked not in a vacuum, but in the context of an already in 
place understanding of the various things someone writing a novel or a decision (or anything else) 
might mean (i.e., intend)."). 
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reader brings to it. "50 
Although framing analysis in terms of reader-response theory has fallen 
somewhat out of fashion, its values are so fundamental to modern creative 
production and interpretation that it seems almost superfluous to invoke it. 
Recognition of the importance of readers and audiences as creators of 
meaning is a defining aspect of modern culture. Mashups and fan-made 
videos are attempts by audiences to extract new meaning from existing 
cultural products. Many elements of modern film and television-
convoluted plot lines, narrative arcs that extend over an entire season, 
mysteries that are revealed episode by episode, and subtle humor, all 
elements requiring reader commitment and even participation-are a far 
cry from the straightforward character- and plot-driven narratives of years 
past.51 Indeed, one commentator has asserted that "twenty-five years of 
increasingly complex television has honed [modern television viewers'] 
analytic skills," including by presenting narratives in which "crucial 
information has been deliberately withheld."52 
The same might be said of the use of literary theory in legal 
interpretation, a practice dating from the mid-1970s. 53 As with literary 
theory generally, legal studies have not had much more than a brief 
engagement with reader-response theory, particularly after the rise of the 
law-and-economics movement and its forceful exposition by Chicago 
School scholars and judges such as Richard Posner and Frank 
Easterbrook. 54 Here, too, the lack of prominence of reader-response as an 
explicit theory of interpretation belies the entrenched position of readers as 
sources of meaning throughout the law. While an author can attempt to 
shape interpretation by the use of form-text formatted as a legal 
complaint or as a contract will cause a reader to interpret the text in a 
50. Mary Crawford and Roger Chaffin, The Reader's Construction of Meaning: Cognitive 
Research on Gender and Comprehension, in GENDER AND READING: ESSAYS ON READERS, TEXTS, 
AND CONTEXTS 3, 3 (Elizabeth A. Flynn & Patrocinio P. Schweickart eds., 1986). 
51. STEVEN JOHNSON, EVERYTHING BAD Is GOOD FOR YOU: HOW TODAY'S POPULAR CULTURE 
Is ACTUALLY MAKING Us SMARTER 13 (2005) (contending that "popular culture has been growing 
increasingly complex over the past few decades, exercising our minds in powerful new ways"); 
ROSENBLATT, supra note 46, at 92 (describing how "[m]uch twentieth-century art, in contrast to 
earlier periods, relies quite overtly on the reader's or perceiver's contribution"); Elizabeth C. 
Hirschman, When Expert Consumers Interpret Textual Products: Applying Reader-Response Theory 
to Television Programs, in 2 CONSUMPTION, MARKETS AND CULTURE 259 ( 1999). 
52. JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 75, 77 (describing how, for example, The West Wing "constantly 
embeds mysteries into the present-tense events"). 
53. Richard H. Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. 
REv. 939, 939 (1986) (identifYing the first "formal colloquy" between legal scholars and literary 
scholars as taking place at a Modern Language Association conference in 1976-78). 
54. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 13 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (suggesting that the law and 
literature movement was a reaction to the law and economics and critical legal studies movements); cf 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 209-211 (rev. ed. 1998) (asserting that "interpretation is 
unlikely to be improved by being made a subject of theory or reflection"). Judge Posner does seem, 
however, to find some useful insights in reader-response theory. See id. at 225 & n.38. 
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particular way, just as will text formatted as a poem55-the ultimate 
meaning and success of any legal text depends on who is functioning as 
the reader. 56 In some instances (as with a contract), the court will fill this 
role itself; in others (false advertising Jaw or defamation), the court will 
ostensibly put itself in the role of the consumer/reader in order to 
determine the meaning of a text. 57 
Thus, while scholars in literary theory typically confine their 
discussions to text that can properly be called "literature," there is no 
reason to so confine it, so long as the differentiating characteristics of the 
text at issue are taken into account.58 And, indeed, scholars in marketing 
and related fields have started to apply the insights of literary theory to the 
kinds of texts that we probably engage with most frequently: advertising, 
branding, and other forms of commercial communication. 59 In particular, 
reader-response theories appear to have gained particular traction, as they 
55. ROSENBLATT, supra note 46, at 82. As Rosenblatt notes, this supplying of context does not 
minimize the reader's role; the text is "a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for any literary work 
of art." !d. at 83. See also Jonathan Culler, Literary Competence, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: 
FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM 101, 103 (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980) {describing how 
formatting journalistic prose as poetry would cause a reader to "subject the text to a different series of 
interpretive operations" even though the text itself had not changed); FISH, Is THERE A TEXT, supra 
note 49, at 332-37 (conducting such an experiment among his students); HANS ROBERT JAUSS, 
TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECEPTION 23 (Timothy Bahti trans., 1982) ("A literary work, even when 
it appears to be new, does not present itself as something absolutely new in an informational vacuum, 
but predisposes its audience to a very specific kind of reception by announcements, overt and covert 
signals, familiar characteristics, or implicit allusions. It awakens memories of that which was already 
read, brings the reader to a specific emotional attitude, and with its beginning arouses expectations for 
the 'middle and end' which can then be maintained intact or altered, reoriented, or even fulfilled 
ironically in the course of the reading according to specific rules of the genre or type of text."). 
56. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 211 ("In the case of documents, whether literary or legal, 
'interpretation' just means reading to make whatever kind of sense one happens to be interested in. 
This might coincide with the writer's intended meaning, but equally it might be a sense that the reader 
wants to impress on the writing for reasons remote from anything the writer had in mind."). 
57. Johnson & Johnson* Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 
960 F.2d 294, 297-298 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is not for the judge to determine, based solely upon his or 
her own intuitive reaction, whether [an] advertisement is deceptive. Rather, as we have reiterated in 
the past, the question in such cases is - what does the person to whom the advertisement is addressed 
find to be the message?") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Robert Rotstein has noted 
that defamation law "regards the text as a reader-dependent process" in that whether or not a particular 
statement is defamatory depends on how it is perceived by its audience. See Robert H. Rotstein, 
Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 725, 
741 & n.73 (1993). 
58. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 270-71 (1984) (noting that 
although, unlike a literary text, a legal text is "in its own terms ... authoritative," the authority of a 
legal text "is not unquestioned" but is "checked, not only against other parts of the reader's being -
other standards and sentiments and wishes- but against other parts of the literature of the law."). Cf 
Gewirtz, supra note 54, at 5 ("[T]he words of court decisions have a force that differentiates them 
from most other utterances. However provocative and generative it may be to treat law as literature, 
we must never forget that law is not literature."). 
59. Cf Scott, The Bridge, supra note I, at 464 ("Advertising, as a genre in its own right, has 
conventions and 'rules for reading' that cannot be discovered by simply superimposing the 
conventions that typify poems, dramas, or novels."). Barbara Stern wrote in 1996 that deconstruction 
had, at that point, "not yet made much of an impact on consumer research." Barbara B. Stern, 
Deconstructive Strategy and Consumer Research: Concepts and Illustrative Exemplar, 23 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 136, 136 (1996). 
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focus on the consumer as an equal meaning-maker in the cultural 
exchange,60 perhaps aided by (or responsive to) the modem trend in both 
entertainment and advertising to communicate to one's audience in ways 
that demand sophistication, willingness to exchange in wordplay, and the 
like. In this school of thought, scholars assess an advertisement as a 
literary text: as something to be "read" and interpreted by a consumer, its 
meaning dependent on the community to which the reader belongs as well 
as the cultural and other tools of interpretation that she brings to the table. 
B. Reader-response and the warning/disclaimer 
Even if we are willing to read advertisements as literary text, given their 
frequent use of imagery and metaphor, we might still resist reading a 
warning or disclaimer as such because doing so implies an author, and our 
image of an author is still, even in an age of collaboration, largely the 
Romantic one. Advertisements typically involve some degree of creativity 
(if not brilliance), designed to elicit an emotional response, whereas 
warnings and disclaimers typically are presented in unadorned prose, 
designed to engender an intellectual response. But, as Foucault has noted, 
characterizing the creator of text as an "author"-and thus her text as 
something worthy of theoretical evaluation-is purely a matter of 
convention. 61 Like an advertisement or brand, a warning or disclaimer is a 
communication from an unseen corporate author to the consumer; like an 
advertisement or brand, the creation of meaning in such communications 
ultimately depends on the consumer. There is no principled basis for 
treating the emotional part of an advertisement as text subject to 
interpretation but treating the informational part of the advertisement as 
empty rhetoric. A reader-response approach to these texts, then, assumes 
an actively engaged reader with respect to both parts of the 
communication, even when the text may be less "literary."62 
A product communication involves at least two authors and at least two 
readers. The first author is the persuasive voice communicating the text of 
the trademark, the advertisement, the commercial, or the other attributes 
60. See supra note I; see also Craswell, supra note 36, at 672 (noting that modern advertising 
relies on consumers' ability to make inferences about implied but unstated messages); Linda M. Scott, 
Images in Advertising: The Need for a Theory of Visual Rhetoric, 21 J. CONSUMER REs. 252, 265 
(1994) (discussing advertising as assuming "an implied viewer who exercises selectivity, uses 
experience with the genre of advertising, and engages in metaphorical thinking"). 
61. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author? in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-
STRUCTURALCRITICISM 141 (Josue V. Harari ed., 1979). 
62. This approach parallels that of one category of the marketing literature, which views 
consumers as able to use their knowledge of persuasion techniques to "maintain control over the 
outcome(s) and thereby achieve whatever mix of goals is salient to them." Marian Friestad & Peter 
Wright, The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion Attempts, 21 J. 
CONSUMER REs. I, 3 (1994); Anna Kirmani & Margaret C. Campbell, Goal Seeker and Persuasion 
Sentry: How Consumer Targets Respond to Interpersonal Marketing Persuasion, 31 J. CONSUMER 
REs. 573, 574 (2004) (reviewing literature). 
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that make a product desirable.63 This author is attempting to communicate 
with an ideal consumer/reader-the consumer who is envisioned to be the 
target for the product.64 For example, an advertisement for a sports car 
might target an ideal reader who is male, in his forties, and with 
significant disposable income. The product warning or disclaimer, 
however, involves two additional voices: the authoritarian voice of the law 
speaking through the manufacturer, and the actual consumer who is 
expected to rationally evaluate this second communication. 65 The ideal 
consumer and the actual consumer are, of course, merged in one physical 
being; thus, her engagement with these texts requires her to be adept at 
countemarrative readings, to understand that a product can be x and also 
not x: beneficial and yet potentially risky, bearing the name of another and 
yet not the other. 
As an example, consider a standard print advertisement for cigarettes. 
The brand message is conveyed by one author-the manufacturer 
encouraging the consumer to see herself as part of the group in the photo 
or to substitute himself for the Marlboro Man. The warning is conveyed 
by another author-the government, whose message is confined to a 
boxed area of the ad-speaking through the manufacturer.66 The former 
text is alluring and metaphorical; the latter text is unadorned and 
stentorian. From a reader-response perspective, however, the "authors" of 
each of these messages-and, in particular, the fact that they are different 
corporate institutions-becomes irrelevant; all that matters is the 
consumer's ability to reconcile these apparently conflicting texts. 67 
63. Scott, The Bridge, supra note I, at 468 (noting that the "implied author" in an advertisement is 
not the corporate advertiser "but a fictive personality suggested by the text itself' that is "closely 
related to the concept of brand personality"). Of course, peers and critics can participate in this 
conversation by recommending or criticizing particular brands. See, e.g., William McGeveran, 
Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1109-1113. 
64. Cf James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. 
REv. 415, 430 (1982) ("[A]s the reader works through a text he is always asking who the 'ideal reader' 
of this text is, and deciding whether he wishes to become such a one, even for the moment."). 
65. Cf Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695,701 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Few questions 
are more appropriately left to a common sense lay judgment than that of whether a written warning 
gets its message across to an average person.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Michael G. 
Johnson, Language and Cognition in Products Liability, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 291, 
304 (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990) ("The duty of the plaintiff, as an ordinary 
reasonable person, is to comprehend and heed a warning message communicated by the defendant if 
the comprehension of the warning is a probable enough interpretation of the message from the vantage 
of an outside observer."). 
66. Cf Hirschman, Scott & Wells, supra note I, at 34 (noting that the imagery in a Marlboro ad is 
an "intertextual reference" to all other Marlboro advertisements, while the government's warning is an 
intertextual reference relating the advertisement to "a myriad of other texts - medical research, 
congressional reports, court records - written to address smoking as a public health issue"); Stern, 
supra note 59, at 141 (describing the contrast between the warning included in a Joe Camel cigarette 
advertisement and the rest of the advertisement as a "power struggle"). Recent legislation in the 
United States will require warnings in cigarette advertising to constitute 20 percent of the area of the 
advertisement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2009). 
67. See Kysar, supra note 6, at 1756 ("The Marlboro Man endures, therefore, not because 
consumers are psychologically vulnerable to rustic, romantic imagery, but because they rationally 
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From here, we can imagine two sets of possible results: one in which the 
consumer rejects the warning or disclaimer and one in which the consumer 
engages with it. First, this reconciliation might result in a consumer who 
so thoroughly accepts the role of ideal reader for the advertisement/brand 
imagery that she cannot accept the countemarrative of the 
warning/disclaimer and so disregards it, seduced by the text of the brand. 68 
Alternatively, the consumer might have learned to be skeptical of all 
communications from producers and so, in this position, rejects not only 
the warning or disclaimer but also the brand narrative. 69 (Presumably, 
however, this consumer has decided not to purchase the product at all and 
so is not the law's primary concern.) Second, the reconciliation might 
result in a consumer who accepts and understands the warning or 
disclaimer, either because she is an enthusiastic reader of all product 
communications or because she is a skeptical reader who can moderate her 
response to distinguish between seduction and warning. 
The literature seems to suggest that the flrst reader-the one seduced by 
the brand or advertising narrative-predominates, thus leading to the 
conclusion that warnings and disclaimers are ineffective. But this is not 
the story that literary theory gives us. Although more work can always be 
done to discover how consumers read cultural texts, we know, at least, that 
the fact that a text is facially ambiguous doesn't mean that consumers are 
unable to negotiate with it. Modem readers are accustomed to making 
meaning out of facially inconsistent text, both in the commercial space and 
outside it. For example, as Stanley Fish has described, we can understand 
the meaning of signs with spelling, grammatical, or punctuation errors 
because we anticipate the meaning from the context; a sign reading 
"PRIVATE MEMBERS ONLY'' on the door of a club is understood to bar 
those who are not members from entering rather than excluding members 
who are circumspect. 70 (Of course, context is critical to interpretation; as 
one court has noted, a sign reading simply "Keep Off the Grass" would 
utilize the imagery to construct their own escapist fantasies.") (discussing George J. Stigler & Gary S. 
Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 76 (I 977)). 
68. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2, at 698-99 (describing a similar view as an instance of 
cognitive dissonance in which "consumers who make a purchase will be reluctant to process safety 
information that conflicts with their sense of having selected a beneficial, risk-free product"); Latin, 
supra note 7, at 1232 (suggesting that consumers will discount the risk of products in light of the 
product's virtues touted in advertising). 
69. Scott, The Bridge, supra note 1, at 464 ("[R]eading as consumers means understanding the 
text as an effort to sell, which in tum implies not only issues of brand awareness or product attribute 
beliefs, but also outright skepticism and resistance."); Hirschman, Scott & Wells, supra note 1, at 48 
(noting that commentary on advertising "can enforce cultural mistrust"); Carrie McLaren, Preface, in 
AD NAUSEAM: A SURVIVOR'S GUIDE TO AMERICAN CONSUMER CULTURE xv, xvii-xviii (Carrie 
McLaren & Jason Torchinsky eds., 2009) (hereinafter AD NAUSEAM) (noting that "[a] well-developed 
sense of skepticism" is "crucial in navigating consumer culture" but that "it gets exhausting quickly"). 
In other words, consumers may believe that advertisers never mean what they say and extend this view 
to the warning or disclaimer. 
70. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT,supra note 49, at 275-77. 
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probably not be interpreted to suggest the presence of deadly snakes. 71 ) 
Slang also sometimes incorporates facially contradictory lexical forms; 
witness, for example, the use of "bad" in some circles to mean "good."72 
Trademark law allows for similar types of ambiguity in reference by 
allowing companies in different markets to use the same trademark, thus 
requiring the consumer to resolve any uncertainty and discard irrelevant 
meanings. 73 As I have previously noted, 
[T]rademarks work only because of the intellectual 
dexterity of the consuming public: a public that sees a 
"swoosh" and is able to associate that symbol with an 
athletic wear manufacturer called Nike; a public that 
recognizes that there may well be both a Continental 
Airlines and a Continental Bank in one commercial space 
and knows, when it hears "Continental" at a particular 
moment, to which entity the word refers; a public that can 
talk about something being a "Mickey Mouse operation" 
without thinking that Disney is behind the scenes; a public 
that hears "Where's the beef?" during a political 
campaign and gets the joke. 74 
And, as marketing scholars have noted, modem advertising often depends 
on irony, parody, and other literary tropes that involve facially 
contradictory texts. 75 Thus, consumers should be presumed to be able to 
engage with messages from two different voices within the same text; 76 
71. Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Corp. , 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); see 
also Gerald Graff, "Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to 
Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REv. 405,407-08 (1982) (noting that '"[k]eep off the grass' would mean 
something entirely different if we overheard the expression uttered by a narcotics-counselor, in 
appropriate circumstances, to a person known to us as a convicted marijuana-user"). 
72. MICHAEL ADAMS, SLANG: THE PEOPLE'S POETRY 62 (2009). 
73. Cf ROSENBLAIT, supra note 46, at 58 ("The baseball reference of'home,' to take an extreme 
example, will not have to be consciously rejected when, say, reading in Ecclesiastes ' man goeth to his 
long home, and the mourners go about the streets.'") . 
74. Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Professor Fleischer, 12 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201,220 (2007). 
75 . Scott, The Bridge, supra note I, at 475 (describing the "mind that is implied by an advertising 
parable" as "one that can hold fiction and reality together at once and select that which is claiming to 
be real from that which is not"); Barbara B. Stem, A Revised Communication Model for Advertising: 
Multiple Dimensions of the Source, the Message, and the Recipient, 23 J. ADVERTISING 5, II (1994) 
("[J]ust as the audience for Goldilocks agrees to believe in talking bears, so too does the audience for 
Star-Kist advertisements agree to believe in talking tunas.") (citation omitted); James H. Leigh, The 
Use of Figures of Speech in Print Ad Headlines, 23 J. ADVERTISING 19-22 (1994) (cataloging 
examples of advertisements involving figures of speech). Cf Geoffrey Nun berg, The Non-Uniqueness 
of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy, 3 LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 143, 180 (1979) ("[W]e construe 
metaphorical word-uses by making a set of assumptions about how the world would have to be for the 
use to be entirely rational and efficient, much as we construe ironical utterances by reference to the 
world in which the utterance might be intended sincerely."). 
76. Edward F. McQuarrie & David Glen Mick, On Resonance: A Critical Pluralistic Inquiry Into 
Advertising Rhetoric, 19 J. CONSUMER REs. 180, 180-81 (1992) (concluding that "resonance" in 
magazine advertising - defined as "wordplay in the presence of a relevant pictorial" - "appears to 
be a widespread phenomenon"). 
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indeed, as several courts have held, parody depends on a reader's 
recognition that the text conveys "two simultaneous-and contradictory-
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is 
instead a parody. "77 Parody is a particularly useful comparison, because 
parody constitutes a counternarrative in two ways: frrst, by subverting the 
reader's initial impression that it is, in fact, its subject and, second, by 
ultimately assuming a critical stance toward its subject.78 Thus, readers 
comfortable with the concept of parody should not be completely averse to 
the idea that a warning or disclaimer might occupy the same stance with 
respect to the advertising it accompanies. 79 
This is not to say, however, that the reader's task is simple. The 
experience that one brings to the interpretive effort may well be shaped by 
class, age, race, and gender, just to name a few interpretive lenses. 80 As 
Walker Gibson noted over fifty years ago, a text asks a reader to take on a 
certain role as a participant in the narrative. A science fiction or fantasy 
novel, for example, demands a certain suspension of disbelief on the part 
of the reader; if the reader cannot take on "that set of attitudes and 
qualities which the language asks [him] to assume," he "throw[s] the book 
away."81 In product communications, these roles are at odds: The 
narrative communicated by the advertising or branding for the product 
asks the consumer to imagine herself as heroic, sensitive, attractive, and 
capable. If she needs the assistance of the product or service being 
advertised, it is likely due to factors beyond her control, such as health 
issues, an accident, or the pressures of modern life. The narrative 
communicated by the warning or disclaimer, however, often asks the 
consumer to imagine herself in a nondominant role: as careless, 
incompetent, hapless, or confused. 82 In order to reconcile these 
77. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359,366 (4th Cir. 2001). 
78. See, e.g., Deborah F. Rossen-Knill & Richard Henry, The Pragmatics of Verbal Parody, 27 J. 
PRAGMATICS 719, 722 (1997) (noting that "the nature of the information conveyed through parody is, 
at minimum a criticism of some object"); id. at 723 (contending that a successful verbal parody must, 
inter alia, effect an "intentional verbal re-presentation of the object of parody"); id. at 728 ("In re-
presentation, however, the hearer must be aware of the original act, hold it up next to the parodying 
version, and work out the parodist's commentary on the original."). 
79. I do not mean to minimize the different interests a consumer might have with respect to each 
of these countemarratives, ranging from entertainment in the case of parody, to product selection in 
the case of trademarks, to personal safety in the case of a product warning. One wonders, however, 
whether the increase in interest along this spectrum might not be accompanied by a commensurate 
intensity of interpretive effort. 
80. Cf Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS L.J. 781 
(2008). 
81. Walker Gibson, Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers, in READER-RESPONSE 
CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM I, I (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980); see also 
WHITE, supra note 58, at 16 ("(O]ne element in the relationship between reader and writer is a kind of 
negotiation in which the reader constantly asks himself what this text is asking him to assent to and to 
become and whether or not he wishes to acquiesce."). 
82. Cf The Idiot Consumer, in AD NAUSEAM, supra note 69, at 247-262 (tracing the advertising 
industry's view of the typical consumer); Grynberg, supra note 36, at 76 (discussing views of 
consumers). 
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countemarratives, the reader must engage with the former while not 
simultaneously pushing back against the latter.83 
To the extent, then, that (as commentators have suggested) some 
consumers appear to be unable to reconcile these roles, a reader-response 
approach would suggest attention to whether the text is, in fact, perceived 
as a countemarrative. Many warnings and disclaimers take the form of 
what might be called "boilerplate"-standard language in a standard form. 
At ftrst glance, one might characterize such text as a countemarrative, 
since the message it conveys is contrary to that connoted by the 
advertising or brand messages. 84 But once the law opines on the legal 
validity of that text, manufacturers, eager to reduce their risk, will heed the 
red pen of the judicial editor, conforming their text to the norm 
suggested. 85 Commentators, likewise, seeking predictability for 
consumers, encourage the use of standard vocabulary and sentence 
structure.86 But it is in precisely this way that the text ceases to be a 
countemarrative. Once consumers expect to see a certain structure and 
vocabulary in a given text, it is no longer surprising to them, and so they 
may well disregard it, meeting a standard text with a standard reaction. 87 
83. Gibson, supra note 81, at 2 ("We resist the blandishments of the copywriter just in so far as 
we refuse to become the mock reader his language invites us to become .... Recognition of a violent 
disparity between ourself as mock reader and ourself as real person acting in a real world is the 
process by which we keep our money in our pockets."). 
84. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REv. 933, 948 (2006) (noting that 
consumers' search costs increase when terms that contradict those made in the primary part of an 
advertisement are included in "fine print"). 
85. See, e.g., Scheman-Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg. Co., 816 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (suggesting form of standard warning); cf Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The 
Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, I 04 MICH. L. REv. II 05, II 07 (2006) (noting that drafters of 
contracts "care more that a clause have a fu:ed meaning than a particular meaning"); Robert B. 
Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1042 (2006) (describing the signaling 
effect of boilerplate language in contracts as arising "not from the substance of the term offered but 
from the proposed term's consistency with or deviation from the preexisting contracting norm") 
(footnote omitted). 
86. Mark A. deTurck, Persuasive Effects of Product Warning Labels, in THE PERSUASION 
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 345, 347 (James Price Dillar & Michael Pfau 
eds., 2002) (suggesting a four-part structure for product warnings, consisting of a "signal word," a 
"hazard statement," a "hazard av')idance statement," and a "consequences statement"); Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 109 (contending that warnings "printed in a standardized format and 
written using a standardized vocabulary" are more easily processed). DeTurck notes, however, that 
"research regarding the necessity of all four elements is inconclusive." DeTurck, supra, at 347. 
87. Aaron C. Ahuvia, Social Criticism of Advertising: On the Role of Literary Theory and the Use 
of Data, 27 J. ADVERTISING 143, !54 (1998) (noting that, for example, "[v]iewers have come to expect 
a certain kind of ad from, say, Hallmark cards, so when they see a new Hallmark ad they are not 
surprised to find a touching and uplifting vignette about the warmth of human relationships"); Jennifer 
J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness of Warning Labels, 23 J. PuB. POL'Y & 
MARKETING 193, 205 (2004) (discussing research showing that "advertisements tend to lose their 
effect through repeated exposure" because "over time messages may become increasingly boring, and 
thus consumers may pay less attention to them"); cf FISH, Is THERE A TEXT, supra note 49, at 45 
(suggesting that rules shared by speakers "will also be constraints on the range, and even the direction 
of response; they will make response, to some extent, predictable and normative."). In Balducci, 
discussed supra notes 4142, the court concluded that consumers were likely to be confused as to the 
source of the (parodic) advertisement at issue because of its location on the magazine's back cover, 
given that consumers are "accustomed to seeing advertisements on the back cover of magazines." 
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In other words, because consumers have become used to seeing warnings 
and disclaimers attached to product communications-so much so that 
warnings and disclaimers have themselves become subjects of parody and 
derision88-the facially disruptive voice actually becomes not disruptive at 
all. 89 Faced with a presumably predictable text, the consumer as reader 
may assume the text's contents rather than actually read and interpret 
them, whereas the manufacturers that write these messages and courts that 
construe them do so with close attention, reflection, and discernment. 90 In 
short, if consumers are told, either directly or indirectly, that a warning or 
disclaimer is legal boilerplate-included only to satisfy some legal 
requirement and not to effectively communicate information-they will 
likely treat it as such. 91 If this is true, then it may be the case that the most 
effective warnings and disclaimers are those adopting a truly 
counternarrative stance-in the sense that they contravene the consumer's 
expectations by, for example, adopting a narrative voice that does not 
suggest mere compliance with legal rules or that speaks in an unexpected 
(i.e., non-stentorian) tone. 92 For example, these communications might 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994). 
88. See, e.g., Happy Fun Ball, http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-
livelvideo/clipslhappy_fun_baiV229058/ (a Saturday Night Live commercial parody in which the 
disclaimers for a toy ball include "If Happy Fun Ball begins to smoke, get away immediately"); J. 
Scott Dutcher, Comment, Caution: This Superman Suit Will Not Enable You to Fly- Are Consumer 
Product Warning Labels Out of Control?, 38 ARIZ. Sr. L.J . 633, 633 (2006) (deriding extensive 
product warnings); Philip K. Howard, The Dynamics of Legal Risk, 56 DRAKE L. REv. 505, 511 
(2008) (same). 
89. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 7, at 1247-48 ("As warnings proliferate in number and length, 
consumers may come to believe that some (or many) are included more to protect manufacturers 
against potential liability than to inform users of significant dangers.") (discussing Temple v. Velcro 
USA, Inc., 196 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). Cf Jacob Jacoby & George J. Szybillo, Why 
Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 224 (1994) (suggesting that disclaimers that "rely on brief 
negator words such as 'no' or 'not"' are particularly likely to be ineffective). 
90. See Boardman, supra note 85, at 1105 (construing boilerplate in contracts as "a private 
conversation between drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could have no 
fair duty to understand, and so has no duty to read"). 
91. Cf FISH, Is THERE A TEXT, supra note 49, at 326-27 (noting that being told that a text is a 
poem leads one to analyze it as such, regardless of the text's formal characteristics). 
92. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1537 (1998) (discussing the "ingenuous" governmental safe-
driving campaign that encouraged drivers to " [w]atch out for the other guy" rather than targeting the 
reader of the ad as careless); Kysar, supra note 6, at 1786 n.364 (suggesting that manufacturers might 
use emotionally based tactics in devising product warnings similar to those used in advertising); Mary 
Ann Stutts & Garland G. Hunnicutt, Can Young Children Understand Disclaimers in Television 
Commercials? , 16 J. ADVERTISING 41, 46 (1987) (suggesting that advertisers may want to test "the 
effectiveness of making the disclaimer [in a commercial aimed at children] part of the action of the 
commercial rather than as a voiceover and/or a written disclaimer"). Cf Steven McElroy, Act I, Scene 
I: The Cellphone Must Not Go On, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010 (Arts & Leisure), at 4 (describing how 
theaters are using irreverent announcements to remind theatergoers to tum off their cellphones). 
Parodies, for example, may want to consider phrasing their disclaimers in a similar tone to that of 
the primary text. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, The North Face Sues the South Butt for Trademark 
Infringement, ABA J., http://www.abajoumal.com/weekly/article/the_north_face_sues_the_south 
_butt_for_tradernark_infringement (Dec. 15, 2009) (noting that disclaimer on online parody site 
reads, "If you are unable to discern the difference between a face and a butt, we encourage you to buy 
North Face Products."); Josh Margolin, Playboy Wants to Muzzle Doggy Web Site, STAR-LEDGER 
HeinOnline -- 22 Yale J.L. & Human. 414 2010
414 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 22:393 
speak in a conversational rather than an authoritative tone, inviting the 
consumer to participate in the creation of meaning. 93 Indeed, some of the 
marketing literature indicates that consumers express positive feelings and 
better recall when wordplay and other rhetorical devices are used in 
advertising, simply because such techniques challenge the consumer and 
make the process of interpretation more enjoyable. 94 Thus, to draw the 
parallel to parody once more, if "the parodist highlights the differences 
between the parodying and parodied voice," thereby "distancing 
him/herself from the parodied point of view,"95 perhaps the warning or 
disclaimer, to be truly seen as counternarrative, should distance itself not 
from the primary voice of the advertisement but from the expected voice 
of the warning or disclaimer itself. 
Neither of these conclusions from literary theory-that consumers are 
adept at interpreting counternarratives but may assume certain 
interpretations from context-requires a view of the consumer as 
cognitively challenged. There is an important normative goal in crediting 
consumers with the responsibility of creating meaning from text-in part, 
to encourage consumers to use the critical skills they have developed in 
engaging with popular culture to negotiate with the more prosaic 
transactions of their daily lives. 96 The continued presence of intelligent 
disclaimers and warnings sends such a signal of expectation, just as the 
(Newark, N.J.), Nov. 18, 1999, at 43 (discussing disclaimer on website for dog lovers called 
"Piaydog" that read, "While there is dog nudity, this site is appropriate for viewers of all ages. If 
you ' re looking for dirty pictures, you ' re barking up the wrong tree."). It may be the case that, as one 
commentator has suggested, that the use of certain rhetorical devices, such as irony, "may attract 
attention to themselves, away from the arguments, and so reduce persuasion." William J. McGuire, 
Standing on the Shoulders of Ancients: Consumer Research, Persuasion, and Figurative Language, 27 
J. CONSUMER REs. 109, 112 (2000). To my mind, this provides even more support for thinking of 
these communications as examples of text or rhetoric and then using the tools developed in these fields 
to analyze their efficacy. 
93 . See, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 206 (1999) ("[A]lthough there are 
sometimes valid reasons for the law's reliance on impersonal constructions, use of first- and second-
person pronouns is preferable when legal documents address members of the public."); id. at 229-230 
(discussing product warnings). 
94 . McQuarrie & Mick, supra note 76, at 194; id. at 192 (suggesting that readers experience 
pleasure as a result of successful decoding of advertisements); Barbara J. Phillips, The Impact of 
Verbal Anchoring on Consumer Response to Image Ads, 29 J. ADVERTISING 15 , 16 (2000) (noting that 
"the entertainment value of rhetorical figures is believed to be the reason that consumers expend the 
cognitive effort necessary to understand the advertising message"); I'm With the Brand: Consumer as 
Fan, in AD NAUSEAM, supra note 69, at 70, 73 ("Ads all but beg to be read ironically: the 'not 
believing' is built right in. That sense of detachment flatters us and keeps us watching."). 
95. Rossen-Knill & Henry, supra note 78, at 728. 
96. I should note here that not every consumer is likely to be so conversant; consumers without 
strong literacy skills or from diverse cultural backgrounds may not interpret text similarly. See, e.g. , 
Ahuvia, supra note 87, at 153 (suggesting that reader-response analysis of advertising should 
understand "a reader' s positioning within society''); McQuarrie & Mick, supra note 76, at 50-51 
(explaining how consumers without relevant cultural backgrounds may find advertising relying on 
visual tropes difficult to interpret); Bruce L. Stern & Robert R. Harmon, The Incidence and 
Characteristics of Disclaimers in Children 's Television Advertising, 13 J. ADVERTISING 12, 15 ( 1984) 
(noting that disclaimers in advertising aimed at children use adult language such as "partial assembly 
required" rather than "you have to put it together to make it work"). Cf FISH, IS THERE A TEXT, supra 
note 49, at 14-15 (describing how interpretive communities produce meaning in a text). 
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norm of including footnotes, endnotes, and other marginalia in academic 
literature sends a similar encouragement to the reader to interrogate the 
main text. 97 By contrast, if the metanarrative of warnings and disclaimers 
is that, despite their presence, they are directed at a reader other than the 
relevant consumer, this narrative becomes dominant. Consumers will 
understand that they are not expected to read such communications and 
may, as a result, ultimately discredit them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To return to the example with which we started: Many television 
commercials for alcohol now conclude with the tag line "Please drink 
responsibly." Although not phrased as a typical product warning, the 
average consumer will (through implicature98) understand it as such: a 
warning that excessive consumption of alcohol risks harm to the consumer 
and/or others. In light of the persuasive imagery that precedes this 
request, some commentators have characterized the tag line as sending a 
mixed message. 99 But as literary theory suggests, the fact that a message 
is mixed doesn't mean that it can't be interpreted. 100 The issue at the core 
of disclaimer, warnings, and similar communications, then, is not that 
consumers are unable to interpret these messages-it is that there is 
disagreement among various interpretive communities as to what these 
messages mean, as the case law in the Introduction illustrates. Rather than 
abandoning warnings and disclaimers as ineffective, courts and 
commentators may well wish to consider ways in which interpretive 
communities form meaning around these texts and, then, to use their 
powers of adjudication and persuasion to help shape interpretive 
strategies. 
97. Balkin, supra note 10, at 279; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark 
Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 99, 136 (2009) (suggesting that "the objective truth that [trademark 
disclaimers] proclaim may become more important than the effects on the subjective understanding of 
consumers"). Contract doctrine's provision that failure to read a contract's terms does not prevent 
enforcement of an otherwise enforceable contract operates similarly. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1187 (1983) ("[T]he traditional 
treatment requires that adherents to form contracts be treated as if they had read and understood the 
document presented to them, even if that conclusion is false and known by the other party to be so."); 
id. at 1191-93 (discussing exceptions). 
98. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22-47 (1989). 
99. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of 
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEA TILE U.L. REV. 3 77, 419 
n.230 (2001) (contending that disclaimers encouraging consumers to "think before you drink" may be 
"neutralize[ d)" by alcohol manufacturers' "other advertising efforts"). Cf Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward 
a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1120 (2002) (contending that 
disclaimers of trademark owner liability "would be inherently ambiguous because they would conflict 
with the assuring message of the trademarks") . 
I 00. Cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be 
Paying Rent?: Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
123, 154 (1995) (describing consumers as "habituated to ambiguity"). 
